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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 12-1757 
___________ 
 
ASIA FRASIER-KANE, 
                            Appellant 
v.  
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;  
POLICE OFFICER DEONA S. CARTER 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-06055 
 (Honorable Legrome D. Davis) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 January 7, 2013 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed: March 29, 2013) 
 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff appeals the district court‟s order granting defendants‟ motion to dismiss 
her claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because plaintiff brought suit outside of the 
limitations period, we will affirm. 
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I. 
Plaintiff Asia Frasier-Kane alleges that on May 15, 2005, defendant Deona S. 
Carter, a police officer, assaulted her and then falsely told other police officers who 
responded to the scene that plaintiff had been the instigator. Plaintiff alleges these 
officers then arrested her. Plaintiff alleges that after investigating the incident, the 
Internal Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Department found Carter had falsified 
her May 15, 2005 police report and suspended her from active duty for twenty days. 
Following the suspension, plaintiff alleges Carter regularly threatened to harm her—
particularly if plaintiff “sa[id] anything else.” Compl. ¶ 27. Plaintiff further alleges Carter 
and fellow officers routinely engaged in acts of intimidation toward her. As a result, 
plaintiff contends she did not pursue legal action out of fear Carter would “severely injure 
or kill her.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff asserts she only brought suit once she learned that other 
individuals had safely brought similar suits against Carter.  
Plaintiff filed suit against Carter and the City of Philadelphia on September 27, 
2011, asserting civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state law claims. 
The district court dismissed plaintiff‟s suit as untimely, finding the Pennsylvania two-
year limitations period for personal injury torts applied and rejecting plaintiff‟s argument 
that the statute of limitations should be tolled for duress under Pennsylvania or federal 
equitable tolling principles.  
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her claims as untimely.
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1
 The district court had jurisdiction over plaintiff‟s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff‟s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 
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II. 
 “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is 
not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). 
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, 
„when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is 
based.‟” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Sameric Corp. v. City 
of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)). The limitations period for an action 
under § 1983 is the limitations period for personal injury torts in the state where the cause 
of action arose. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387. The state‟s tolling principles also generally 
govern § 1983 claims, but “[w]here state tolling principles contradict federal law or 
policy, federal tolling principles may apply in certain limited circumstances.” Kach, 589 
F.3d at 639. We have recognized three general circumstances in which federal equitable 
tolling is appropriate: “(1) where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to 
her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as 
a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts her claims 
                                                                                                                                                             
1367(a). As this is an appeal from final judgment, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. We have plenary review of an order granting a motion to dismiss a claim under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 
263 F.3d 296, 325 (3d Cir. 2001). “We „accept all factual allegations as true, construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.‟” Byers v. 
Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l 
Ctrs.—Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 523 (3d Cir. 2009)). A statute of limitations defense 
may be asserted in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “where the complaint facially 
shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly 
appears on the face of the pleading.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 
F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 
370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The parties agree plaintiff‟s cause of action arose in Pennsylvania, which has a 
two-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (citing 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2)). Plaintiff‟s cause of action accrued on May 15, 2005, the 
date of the alleged assault. Because plaintiff did not file suit until September 27, 2011, 
her claims are untimely unless the statute of limitations is tolled.  
Plaintiff does not argue that Pennsylvania would toll the statute of limitations on 
the circumstances of this case. See id. at 640 (“[N]either the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania nor either of Pennsylvania‟s intermediate appellate courts has definitively, 
or even circumspectly, addressed whether duress may toll the statute of limitations.”). 
But plaintiff contends Pennsylvania tolling principles are inconsistent with the policies 
underlying § 1983, and therefore federal tolling principles should apply. Plaintiff argues 
we should toll the statute of limitations because the duress under which she was placed 
by defendant Carter constituted an extraordinary circumstance. 
While we are skeptical that Pennsylvania tolling principles frustrate the policies 
underlying § 1983, we need not consider the issue because, like the district court, we find 
even our federal equitable tolling principles would not toll the statute of limitations for 
plaintiff.  
“Federal courts may toll statutes of limitations for federal laws where the plaintiff 
„in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights.‟” Lake, 
232 F.3d at 370 (quoting Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997)). But 
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“[t]he remedy of equitable tolling is extraordinary, and we extend it „only sparingly.‟” 
Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Irwin v. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). In Kach, the plaintiff alleged she was 
held captive by a security guard from her middle school for ten years, from February 
1996, when she was fourteen, to March 2006. 589 F.3d at 630-32. Kach brought a § 1983 
suit against city officials, school district officials, and others in September 2006, 
contending her claims should not be barred by Pennsylvania‟s two-year statute of 
limitations
2
 because, among other reasons, she was under duress from her captor until she 
was removed from his house in March 2006. Id. at 639-40. We affirmed the district 
court‟s grant of summary judgment for defendants, finding Kach‟s § 1983 claims 
untimely. Id. at 651. We explained that while “[t]he circumstances of Kach‟s case 
certainly may be described as „extraordinary‟ in the vernacular sense of that word[,] [w]e 
nevertheless conclude that Kach has not met her burden of showing that this is one of 
those extraordinary cases warranting the application of any federal equitable tolling 
provision.” Id. at 645 (citation omitted).  
Kach effectively forecloses plaintiff‟s argument that duress should toll the statute 
of limitations. If there were any doubt, a comparison to Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 
F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996), which plaintiff cites in her brief for support, is illustrative. In 
Hilao, a class of Philippine nationals brought suit against their former president, 
Ferdinand E. Marcos, alleging they suffered torture and other human rights violations 
under his regime. Id. at 771. The Ninth Circuit tolled the statute of limitations on 
                                                 
2
 With accrual at her eighteen birthday in October 1999. 
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plaintiffs‟ claims for the time that Marcos was president because many victims “did not 
report the human-rights abuses they suffered out of intimidation and fear of reprisals,” 
which the court found understandable, and because of “the effective dependence of the 
judiciary on Marcos” as well as his immunity from suit while in office. Id. at 773.  
Hilao is clearly distinguishable on its facts. First, the alleged duress in Hilao was 
one of several compelling factors influencing the court‟s decision to toll the statute of 
limitations. Second, Marcos allegedly exercised comprehensive control over Philippine 
society and hence over the plaintiffs‟ ability to obtain relief. Defendant Carter is by no 
means an authority figure capable of exerting influence of a similar magnitude.  
Very few situations will be considered “extraordinary” like those in Hilao. 
Plaintiff‟s alleged circumstances—much like those in Kach—do not rise to such a level. 
Accordingly, the statute of limitations may not be tolled. 
III. 
We will affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff‟s claims with 
prejudice.
3
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 “[I]nadequate complaints should be dismissed without granting leave to amend . . . if 
amendment would be . . . futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  
